[HMK Home] Czechoslovakia The Land of Lawlessness

                                               

 

 

 

 

 

 Zoltán Balassa

Czechoslovakia

The Land of Lawlessness

On the Benes Decrees

Hungarian Times Pamphlets

I

Trianon Society 2002

A Few Introductory Remarks

 

When the first version of my comments on the Benes Decrees was published in 1996 it seemed that this issue was unlikely to appear before the international political public opinion at any time soon.  There were numerous articles on this matter in the German and Czech papers but these were largely unknown to the Hungarian readers.

Yet, I felt that this matter had to be discussed since inhumanity must be reckoned with and therefore I continued to collect material and do more research.

The present publication is the third and final format on this subject.  It is timely because Victor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister, has answered a question in a way that caused a major uproar in Czech and Slovak circles.  It is also evident from the numerous statements and publications following this event, that there are only a few who really are familiar with the facts.

Peter Weiss, the Slovak Parliamentary Representative argues that these Decrees were part of the international agreements reached after World War II. This raises the question as to why Czechoslovakia promulgated legal edicts that were contrary to her own constitution?  Did the related international agreements really mandate inhuman treatment?  This dilemma hides another very important question.  In Czechoslovakia, after 1989, they tried to emphasize that in the matter of compensations they had to go back only as far as 1948 because prior to the Communists coming to power, the country was democratic.  The facts state otherwise.

We must also ask why it is necessary to adhere to a shameful legal practice that is contrary to the Declaration of Human Rights?

To the last question we must append the frequently voiced erroneous opinion, voiced recently even by Mikul·s Dzurinda, the Prime Minister of Slovakia that these ordinances were no longer in effect.  It is a serious matter when the Head of the Government is ignorant of the facts!  The statement can be disproved with great ease.  A large number of people in Slovakia cannot get back their formerly expropriated goods and real estate because the Beneö Decrees make it impossible.  Let it suffice to bring up one example without going into the details.  The building of the Rimaszombat gymnasium was formerly the property of the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches and these Churches would like to have the building returned to them.  The Rimaszombat District Court was in favor of the petition and approved it (6C 203/99).  Attorney Viera Kadaŝova, acting for the Gymnasium appealed.  In the appeal he explained that in the opinion of the appellant the Beneö Decrees applied to the Calvinist Church in the following manner:

The assets reverted to the State according to the Presidential Decree #12, 1945 Zb on the date of issuance of said Decree on June 25, 1945.  In our view the confiscation is on the basis of a Public Act ordinance and as such it is according to a Public Act.  This principle is incorporated in Decrees 12/1945 Zb and 108/45 Zb as well.  In our view it is characteristic of these decrees that the corpus of the confiscated assets are not only the property of the traitors and the enemies of the country but it is also under the accepted principle of collective guilt, the property of persons of German or Hungarian nationality, and is thus independent of personal guilt (Ka 94/99, 2001, 4. 26).

The writer of this essay is aware of the fact that to declare that these ordinances are invalid as a matter of principle, because they are in contradiction, both literally and in principle, to the Czechoslovak constitution in effect at that time may lead to serious difficulties.  Yet this is no reason not to examine and confront the facts and the past.

There is, however, another inevitable aspect to this matter.  If the countries wishing to join the European Union must adapt their legal system to the rules of the Union, then neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia can pretend that their past and present offenses against basic human rights did not exist.  To achieve this only three things are required, courage, decency and honesty to include an appraisal of the past.

 

Kassa, Easter 2002

                                                                                                                                                                                               Zoltán Balassa

Czechoslovakia

The Land of Lawlessness

On the Benes Decrees

 

"The large majority of the people spend their entire life outside of the bounds of objectivity..."

                                                                                István Bibó [1]

 

When the first Czechoslovak Republic was established in 1918, hallowed by the victorious powers in Trianon, the politicians who had set up the Republic were certainly not short on high-sounding statements.  They were talking of an Eastern Switzerland[2] where every racial group will feel at home and will be able to develop freely.  There was, in fact, a formal democracy in Czechoslovakia, that had retained its halo to this day, but the leading politicians were never able to rid themselves of their Pavlovian nationalist reflexes.  As P·l SzvatkÛ had so wittily remarked, the minorities were only sniffing the democracy from below in the Czechoslovakia between the two wars.  This was sufficient to debase the entire structure of Democracy.  The Czechoslovak statesmen carry the burden of responsibility for the masses forced into a minority role turning them away from democracy.[3]

In the matter of population displacement Beneŝ tried already in 1937 to reach an agreement with Hitler.  On September 18, 1938 he forwarded a ìcompromiseî peace plan to the French government according to which two million Sudeten Germans would be moved out of Czechoslovakia in exchange for a guarantee of Czechoslovakiaís protection and economic structure.  It was partly for this reason that France supported the plan for the Munich conference.[4]  Evidently, because at that time the French politicians were still repelled by such an inhumanity.

The country, established in a cavalier fashion, demonstrated in 1938 that it lacked any cohesive force.  As soon as its foreign policy force field changed, the state fell apart exactly as in 1992 when the Soviet hegemony disintegrate

 

I.

"So in everything do unto others what you would have them do to you I tell you the truth,
whatever you did to one of the least of these, you did for me."

    Matthew, 7,12 and 25,40

 

The first Slovak Republic was established under German pressure on March 14, 1939.  We mention this because there was talk even then of removing the Hungarians from Slovakian territory.[5]  This National Socialist plan was implemented by Eduard Beneŝ and his government.  Another fact of interest is that the former Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Head of State was also the most powerful figure in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.[6]

Several contemporaries noticed that there was a tight parallelism between the propaganda of the Tiso regime and the Czechoslovak government in exile in London.  Could this be just a coincidence?  This is unexplored territory.

The Czech and Slovak politicians in London made plans according to which the reconstituted country would be Slavic.  To accomplish this, the Germans and Hungarians would be removed and those who remained would be assimilated.  It was this that made the otherwise completely unnecessary attack against the Dukla Pass important.[7]    Because of the Romanian switch at the beginning of September 1944, the Red army could have entered the Carpathian Basin without any difficulty and there was no need to force an entry across the crest of the Northern Carpathians.  The idea was that if the front moved from North to South, the Hungarians would flee from the fighting toward the south and would then not be permitted to return.  This would have made the proposed ethnic cleansing a fait accompli.  The attempt caused enormous losses to the attackers and achieved nothing. The Hungarians remained in their native land.

After the so-called liberation the Czechoslovak government, on April 5, 1945 announced the notorious Kassa Government Program that according to Gyula IllyÈs was a ìclinical manifestation of the Lebensraum psychosisî.[8]  The Czechoslovak powers could not have selected a more pregnant date because it was precisely one year earlier on April 5, 1944 that it was made mandatory in Hungary for the Jews to wear the yellow star.[9]

Czechoslovakia enacted such disenfranchising ordinances against the Germans and Hungarians that achieved essentially the same as the inhuman anti-Jewish ordinances of the previous year.[10]  It is quite legitimate to ask what good was the dreadful loss of life when the racial hatred not only did not disappear but became the official policy of the reborn country.[11]

The vindictive and trying ordinances led to a significant decrease in the number of Hungarians in Slovakia.  The number of Hungarians in Slovakia was estimated by the people attempting to make Slovakia totally Slovak at 758,000.[12]  By July 1, 1945, the Czechoslovak authorities expelled almost 32,000 Hungarians from the area that was reattached to Hungary by the first Vienna Award.[13]  It was at the same time that the intellectuals began to flee the country.  By April 10, 1948 more than 68,000 people moved to Hungary under the population exchange agreement and to this number another 7,000 people must be added who either moved voluntarily or who fled the country.[14]

After the war the ìPeopleís Courtsî were set up whose task it should have been to bring those who had committed inhumanities during the previous period to justice.  Of those accused 29% were Slovakian and 60% were Hungarian at a time the Slovakians represented 69.2% of the population and the Hungarians 21.1%.[15]  Of those who were found innocent, the Hungarians represented more than 73%. [16]  Our country irresponsibly agreed to accept the Hungarian war criminals upon which the Czechoslovak authorities presented a list of some 75,000 names identified as Hungarian war criminals.  20-30% of all Hungarian living in the southern districts were included in this list.[17]  In the end, Hungary accepted 5,000 so-called war criminals, with another 10,000 persons under the population exchange agreement.[18] 

In Czechoslovakia 45,000 men were deported for forced labor.[19]  The deportations implemented with the greatest brutality were reminiscent of the worst excesses of the former slave markets and were only faintly obscured by being called labor recruitment efforts.[20]   This ordinance had two purposes, to frighten the Hungarians and also to force the Hungarian government to implement the population exchange that would have been equivalent to the elimination of all Hungarians from Slovakia.[21] 

The total number of the Hungarians in the FelvidÈk (Upper Hungary) was thus reduced to 624,000.  If it had been successful at the Paris Peace Conference to arrange for the deportation of another 200,000 Hungarians, the total previous number would have been reduced to two-thirds.  Sociologic studies have shown that if one-third is removed from any population group, the remainder will disappear.  Some of the representatives of the Slovakian power structure have not given up on this project to this day as became evident at the Horn-Mečlar meeting.  The Head of the Slovakian Government, in a somewhat hazy form, suggested an exchange of population, exactly 50 years after the above painful events.[22]

The most recent studies have shown that there were several plans to eliminate the Hungarians from Slovakia.  The most brutal one was proposed by the army.  According to this, all people living within an area 20-30 Kms from the border were to be removed and the entire area would have become a no-manís-land.[23]  In the Sudeten area this plan was implemented to some degree.  Old graveyards, churches and settlements were destroyed by the war against the past, disguised as a military practice maneuver.[24]

Another plan, saturated with hatred was elaborated by Emanuel B–hm, a former high school teacher in Kassa.[25]   Yet, some years ago he was honored by the Slovak Head of State, Michal Kovač, who awarded him posthumously the Order of the White Apostolic Double Cross, Second Rank, in recognition of his efforts for democracy, on occasion of the National Constitution Memorial Day, on September 1, 1997.  B–hm was buried in the T™rÛcszentm·rton National Cemetery.[26]  

We must also not forget the re-Slovakization that was based on the completely false premise that in Slovakia only Hungarized Slovaks were living whom the mother country must gather to her heart as her estranged children.[27]  This decision is being explained away even today although it is evident that it completely meets the definition of genocide.  Genocide need not be performed with physical means and weapons, but can be achieved with terror.  This latter is recognized and condemned by international law.[28]  

In the fear that they would be expelled from their native soil, more than 435,000 persons applied for re-Slovakization.  The authorities were graciously pleased to render a favorable decision in more than 282,000 cases and the petition of another 11,000 persons was taken under advisement.[29]

Because of all these trials the official number of Hungarians in Slovakia was reduced to 355,000 according to the 1950 census even though by this time a large number of Hungarians who had applied for re-Slovakization again claimed to be Hungarians.  The Hungarians in the FelvidÈk have been unable to recover to this day and it will be a very long time before they will be able to do so.  It would be highly desirable because of the terror of those early days there are many who even today fear to declare themselves to be Hungarians.

In all fairness, however, it must be stated that the Czechs treated the Germans much more brutally than the Slovaks the Hungarians.[30]  This obviously cannot be used as an excuse and furthermore was not even successful.[31]  Ethical issues can have no relativity.

In Prague the Germans were forced to crawl on their hands and knees over broken glass.  There were mass executions where one prisoner was forced to hang another prisoner, was hanged in turn by another one and so on.[32]  People were burned alive.  In UstÌ nad Labem infants in baby carriages were thrown into the river and used for target practice.[33]  A letter ìNî was branded on the forehead of Germans.  It will remain the eternal shame of the Czechoslovakia of that time that neither the press nor the leading politicians did anything stop or at least decrease these sadistic excesses.[34]

The Slovak Parliament apologized to the Germans and to the Jews and this was a noble gesture.[35]  Yet in its totality many more Hungarians were oppressed in those years in Slovakia, naturally by legal means.[36]  Leaving the human issue for the moment it is worthwhile to examine the legal background.

II.

"The many bestialities perpetrated on the Germans, prisoners, civilians,
women and even children after May 1945 remain an indelible part of the picture that
characterized Czechoslovakiaís post war legal and moral stand and
were a predictor of the developments of the subsequent years and decades." 

 VilÈm Hejl [37]

 

Speaking of the Beneŝ Decrees[38] we should note that these encompass approximately ninety ordinances and public acts issued by the central authorities and the Slovakian National Council[39], the highest legislative body in Slovakia.  Some of them were issued by the Office of the Delegates[40] (Megbizottak Hivatala), the legal arm of the Slovakian government.  In order to understand the legal ramifications we have to go back to 1934.

It was in May of this year that Tom·ŝ Garrigue Masaryk was elected Head of State for the fourth time.  Because of his age, he was born on March 7, 1850, he resigned from the presidency on December 14, 1935 and recommended that Eduard Beneŝ be his successor. Four days later, on December 18, 430 of 450 senators and representatives cast their vote for Beneŝ.[41]  These included the Hungarian representatives as well.  The new Head of State promised the Hungarians that he would never forget it.  He stated, ìPresident Beneŝ thanks the Hungarians for their chivalry, sincerity and honest behavior shown before and during the elections.î[42]  It is a pity that ten years later he did forget all this.

An Act promulgated in 1920 and in effect until May 1948 stated, ìLegislative power for the entire area of the Czechoslovak Republic is exercised by the National Assembly consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate (Par.6, 1/c)î  ìUnless decreed otherwise by the present Act the quorum of either Chamber consists of one third of the members (!). In order for a decision to be valid more than half of those present most vote in favor of it.î (Par. 32)  It was Par. 57 which regulated the election of the President.  In order for the election to be valid more than one half of the members of the House and Senate duly elected at the time of said vote must be present and the motion must be carried by a majority of three fifth of those present and voting.î(1/c)[43]  As we have seen, the election of the president took place according to the prescribed legal procedure.  The House of Representatives had 300 members (Par. 8) and the Senate 150 (Par.13).  Accordingly the new President received many more votes than prescribed by the law as a minimum.

In Czechoslovakia, the Head of State was elected for seven years (Par. 58, 2.c.) and thus Beneŝí mandate would have expired on December 17, 1942.  The constitution naturally made it possible for the President to resign (Par. 59) but was indifferent as to the reasons for it.  The constitution does not address this issue and only states that in such a situation a new President had to be elected.

When the Munich Conference directed that the territories inhabited by Germans be turned over to Germany, Beneŝ resigned on October 5, 1938 and on the 22nd left the country as a private person.  He wired President Roosevelt on March 16, 1939 and asked that the Government of the United States not recognize those parts of Czechoslovakia occupied by the Germans the previous day.  He signed the wire as ìthe former president of Czechoslovakiaî thus acknowledging his having resigned from that office.

Emil H·cha was elected President on November 30, 1938 by the two chambers of the National Assembly according to the procedure prescribed by the constitution. Of the 312 members 272 voted for him, although 187 would have sufficed to elect him.[44]  The President took his oath of office that same day and thus his mandate would have come to an end on November 29, 1945.  He died after the liberation of Prague in a prison hospital on June 27, 1945, somewhat before his 73rd birthday.[45]

Eduard Beneŝ stayed first in the United States, then for a short time in France and finally, until the end of the war in London.  Other than a visit to Moscow in November-December 1943, he stayed in London until March 1945.  In London on October 15, 1941, still as a private person, he issued a ìPresidential Constitutional Decreeî in which he empowered himself with presidential authority and the ability to enact, amend or suspend laws.  He issued his February 22, 1945 Decree while still in the British capital in which he empowered himself with dictatorial authority until the interim constitutional National Assembly could be convoked.  This took place on October 28.  It was the period between May 8 and October 28 when the Beneŝ Decrees were issued, but their issuance was foretold well in advance by the Kassa Governmental Program.

None of these proceedings were authorized legally by the Czechoslovak constitution which makes no mention of presidential ordinances.  Thus Beneŝ would have lacked the right to do this, even if he had been the legitimate head of State.  In other words he acted illegally as a private person.  It can not be thought of in any other way except as an arbitrary action.  It must be emphasized that this assessment is valid for all the presidential ordinances because, as stated earlier, legislative powers rested solely and exclusively with the legislature.

On October 28 the interim, single-chamber National Assembly was called into session.  It was not an elective body but its members were appointed.  This was also contrary to the constitution which states unequivocally that representatives had to be elected (Pars. 8 and 13).   

ìOn February 28, 1946 the interim National Assembly enacted a constitution that raised all the presidential decrees to the level of public acts.  The members of this Assembly, it should again be noted, were not elected.  Non-elected representatives enacted the laws promulgated by a non-elected president.  Lawyers of all lands, think about that!î[46]

This body confirmed Beneŝ in his position as Head of State.  This was a serious violation of the constitution because Beneŝ resigned in 1938 and even if he hadnít his term expired in 1942.  It is evident that he would have had to be re-elected.  This actually did take place later, after the parliamentary election, but again it was only a single chamber of Parliament that acted and from a constitutional perspective this made the entire action moot.

Public Act 115/1946, enacted by the interim National Assembly decreed that any person who between October 30, 1938 and October 28, 1945, i.e. considerably after the end of the war, fighting for the freedom of the Czechs or Slovaks, or enacting retribution on the occupying forces or their supporters committed acts that would ordinarily be punishable by law would not be held accountable for any such action.  The Constitutional Committee described the proposed Act on May 7, 1946 saying that the technically criminal acts committed were not punishable because in the absence of freedom, these acts were performed as a substitute for the law of society against the occupying forces.  In other words, every sadist, murderer and robber was forgiven if he claimed that his felonious acts were committed in the interest of freedom of the two nations.  The enactment of such a law clearly means the end of the state as a lawful entity.  Hejl  drew an appropriate parallelism between the law and ordinance 213/1948, enacted for the protection of the popular-democratic system and which in a similar fashion legalized tyranny, violence and murder.[47]

Parliamentary elections were held on May 26, 1946.  As we have seen, the constitution prescribed that any law required the approval of both chambers before it could be enacted.  Thus anything enacted by this rump assembly could not be raised to the level of law.  A similar situation prevailed in the Slovakian National Assembly and Representative Committee.  These newly established Slovak structures were not recognized by the constitution and thus their activity, legislative and enactive, was a violation of the lawful constitution.

The above ordinances are not only incompatible with law but clearly meet the principles of racial discrimination.  What did the constitution say about this?  ìAll inhabitants of the Czechoslovak Republic, regardless of birth, citizenship, race or religion enjoy the complete and absolute protection of their life and freedom, exactly like the citizens of the country and in every area of the country.î (Par.106 2/c).  ìEvery citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic regardless of race, language or religion is equal before the law and enjoys the same civil and political rights.î (Par. 128, 1/c).  ìForceful deprivation of nationality is forbidden in every form.  Infraction of this principle may be declared a violation of the law.î (Par. 134).  It is indeed curious that the last ordinance uses the potential form.  This is very unusual because it does not take direct action against a forbidden act.[48]

 

 

 III.

 

"One need not do anything else but compare the Benes Decrees with human rights and becomes
  immediately apparent that the two are incompatible."

                                                          Otto von Habsburg [49]

 

 

Summarizing the above we can state that Eduard Beneŝ, following his resignation in 1938, was never re-elected as the legitimate Head of State of Czechoslovakia.  Thus the government appointed by him could also not be legitimate.  Furthermore, the Head of State, the representatives, the press and other public figures agitated against the Germans and Hungarians and thereby committed illegal acts.  The Kassa Government Program had no legal basis.

The Prague legislature was a rump and therefore could not enact lawful legislation and the same holds for the two Slovak organizations mentioned above.  The ordinances approved, published, voted for and enacted by the above organizations were illegal from the moment of their enactment.  They also employed discriminatory techniques reminiscent of the excesses of the Nazi period, and which were prohibited by the constitution and made potentially punishable.

Because the 1920 constitution also guaranteed personal freedom (Par. 107), and declared that private property could be expropriated only on the basis of law and had to be compensated, assuming that the laws did not specifically state that compensation should or could not be provided. (Par. 109).  A Public Act enacted by illegal procedures cannot be considered a legal ordinance and the rights listed above could be curtailed only by legitimately enacted legislation (Par. 107. 2/c and 108, 2/c).

Of resettlement and loss of citizenship there is no mention in the constitution.[50]

Loss of citizenship in peacetime could be imposed in Czechoslovakia by the Ministry for Internal Affairs only for one of the following reasons:

1. If the person emigrated and received a citizenship in another           country.

2. If the person accepted a position under a foreign government.

3. If a person lived outside Czechoslovakia for ten years continuously           and not on the service of Czechoslovakia.

4. If a minor was recognized as legitimate by a father holding a           foreign citizenship and the fatherís citizenship was available to the     minor.

5.  If a woman married a person holding a foreign citizenship.[51]

 

We can see that none of the above applied to the situations described earlier and thus the Czechoslovak Republic did not have the right to revoke citizenships.  It acted contrary to its own laws.  ìConstitutional law and order, i.e. limited governmental powers within the constraints imposed by the constitution, were destroyed in Czechoslovakia in 1945î [52]  We should not be surprised by VilÈm Hejlís aphoristic statement that links May 1945, the moment of liberation, with February 1948, the forceful Communist takeover. ìWho would have thought that in May February was already banging on the door?î[53]  The Lawful State was dying as early as 1945.[54]

All this makes it understandable why the Czech Republic holds on so grimly to its legally indefensible position.  If it were to recognize the above arguments as valid, it would have to compensate several million people.[55]  Compensation could be demanded on legal grounds and the original estate would have to be returned to the former owner, legal heir or legal designee.[56]

The same is true for the Slovak Republic.  This country will also have to face up to the economic side of the problem, let alone the ethical one. Otto von Habsburg has stated that unless the Czech and Slovak Republics declared that the Beneŝ Decrees were invalid, they would not be admitted to the European Union.[57]  Consequently re-examination of this entire matter is not only very timely but has some very practical indications.  Doleûal claims, however, that there is no intention on the Czech side to resolve the Sudeten question.[58]  The situation has not changed since that time.  The European Council had recommended that Slovakia rescind the Beneö Decrees but this proposal has been rejected by both Heads of State, V·clav Havel and Michal Kov·č.  According to Havel these Decrees were the outcome of World War II and hence the injuries of those days cannot be remedied by rescinding the Decrees.[59]  According to J·n Ĉarnogursky, the President of the Christian Democrat Movement, ìThe Decrees are associated with the past that we consider to be a closed issue and hence we do not wish to change them.î  This lawyer-politician considers the population exchange to be in order.[60]  Rudolf Schuster, the Slovak Head of State is of German extraction but seems to be afflicted by fate with the same kind of judgment as his political associate, ìItís too early to assess the value of the Decrees, because many of the people affected by them are still alive.  We must wait and history will have to determine whether they were effective, who was injured by them and whose interests had been affected.  In my view extensive or collective punishment is never just since people, individuals or entire families were not given the opportunity to defend themselves.  Let us leave this to the historians.  It is too early to evaluate the Beneŝ Decrees.î[61]  Apart from the internal inconsistencies of the quoted text and its alibiing, we can draw a rather startling conclusion from it.  If somebody was treated illegally, this need not be remedied, but one must wait until the individual dies.[62]

In conclusion, everybody should carefully consider Istv·n BibÛís warning.  He states,  ìOur evaluation by the world and our comparison with other countries will not be determined by how much we admit, deny or explain away, but by the seriousness with which we determine our own responsibility, because it can be expected only in that event that our country will demonstrate more dignity in a future situation.î[63]

                                      

 

 


                                                          Notes

 

 

 

[1] I. BibÛ: Selected Essays II., Magvető, Budapest 1986, p. 728

 

[2] ìAt one point the best and most just Czech thinkers argued before the world that they wished to make their new country into a new Switzerland, ìune sorte de Suisseî.  Europe welcomed this plan with applause.î P. SzvatkÛ: The Experience of Change, Kalligram, Pozsony, 1994,  p. 191Ö. ìI was one of those who at one time believed the Czechoslovakia could develop into a new SwitzerlandÖî R. PeÈry: Thoughts in a cattle car or defense of the Hungarians in Slovakia.î Kalligram, Pozsony, 1993, p. 21.  ìAmong the Eastern-Central and South-Central European countries, only the Czech statesmen, including Eduard Beneŝ approved the principle of legal protection for the minorities, going so far as to state that they wished to transform the Czechoslovak Republic into a sort of Switzerland.î I. Romsics: Beneŝ promised a sort of Switzerland, Vas·rnap, October 4, 1998, p. 4.  ìOther than Switzerland, Slovensko is the only trilingual country.  What an opportunity was lost here.  Here I can show that almost every family has a Slovak, German or Hungarian ancestor.î Z. F·bry: In Neutral, Regio, Mad·ch, Kalligram Budapest, Pozsony, 1991. p. 130.

 

[3] ìÖBetween the two wars they were treated in the Republic as Czech minority and not as an equal partner in a multicultural country.  In the majority of the Germans this lead to the point where they preferred Hitler.î Gy. Sch–pflin: Czechs, Germans and Ethnic Cleansing.  Magyar Narancs. March 28, 1996, p. 40.

 

[4] The essay of Michel Bernard in the Revue des Etudes Slaves 1979/1-2.  Discussed by J. Kr·lik: Naozaj pravda vÌtíazÌ.. (Does truth prevail?) It refers to the slogan of the Czech Head of State: Pravda VitezÌ! (Truth Prevails). ìBeneŝ had declared as early as November 1938 that this war would do away with the minorities.î Z. F·bry, op.cit. p. 74.

 

[5] ìAlexander Mach, Slovak Minister of the Interior, developed almost unlimited revisionist propaganda against Hungary, building a scientific approach to the idea of expelling the Hungarian population.  In this he was years ahead of the London ÈmigrÈ nationalists.  In the paper, Gardista, he introduced an anti-Hungarian tone which far exceeded even the chauvinist accomplishment of the press directed by the Centralist Slovak Nationalists.  It was this political structure that introduced into public awareness the concept of population expulsion or population exchange as a solution of the minority issues confronting the Slovakia enlarged by the peace treaties.î  PeÈry, op.cit. p.215.  ìKarmasinís plans included the deportation of the Hungarians from Slovakia because the majority of the Hungarians opposed the proposed Fascist developments for Slovakia..  In their place Karmasin and his group envisaged the settlement of 100,000 German families so that the empty space left by the Hungarians is filled by a people of higher standing.î NÈpszabads·g, June 7, 1962., Uj Szo, June 7, 1962, Cited by Z. F·bry,: The Misery and Grandeur of the Hungarian Minority, Žj SzÛ, June 28, 1968.

 

[6] ìFascism could be socialistic only within its own nationalism.  Precisely as indicated in the name it gave itself: National Socialism.  This was an impressively honest limitation vis-ý-vis the currently dominant and Pharisaical Slavic Fascism that similarly is able to establish Socialism only within the framework of nationalism and to the exclusion of everything else.  The difference being that the latter preached Democracy but introduced Communism.  Yet the entire issue is simply one of a pure Slavic National Socialism where Democracy and Communism are just a stage set behind which the Beneŝ and Stalin Hitlerism flourishes.î Z. F·bry, op.cit. p. 142.  F·bry, like many others uses the term Fascism instead of National Socialism.  Yet the Third Reich is a post-Fascism structure.  Hitler cannot be called a Fascist.  The confusion existing even to this day is due to Stalin forbidding the term National Socialism about 1932 and insisted that instead the terms Fascism or Hitlerism be used. Luk·cs, J.:The Historical Hitler, Europa, Bp. 1998. pp. 44, 128, 114.

 

[7] Between September 8 and October 28, 1944  21,000 Soviet and 1847 Czechoslovak soldiers died and 63,000 Soviet and 4,700 Czechoslovak soldiers were wounded.  The battle was forced allegedly to assist the Slovak national uprising although such assistance was not in the interest of the Soviet leadership.  ìIf the Hungarian withdrawal discussed in the Hungarian-Soviet armistice negotiations had taken place the Slovak armed forces and the Czech forces in the Dukla Pass could have implemented the plans for the expulsion of the Hungarians claiming that it was a voluntary escape on their part.

                The Moscow Za svobodnÈ Československo (For a Free Czechoslovakia) issued a proclamation to the soldiers of the Czechoslovak army in Dukla, on October 6, 1944, after they had crossed the Polish-Czechoslovak border.  The proclamation entitled: We are at home, stated, ìThe cleansing of the Czechoslovak Republic of Germans, Hungarians and traitors is beginning. (The Hungarian delegation under FaraghÛ was already in Moscow at this time).  While the negotiators of the Hungarian Horthy regime were acting in good faith, the Moscow proclamation continued with, ìThe only traitor who cannot betray us is the one cruelly punished.  Only those Germans and Hungarians are no longer dangerous whom we have taught what happens to those who take something not theirs.î

                Simply stated, ìIf  Hungaryís getting out of the war in October 1944 had been successful, the Hungarians in Slovakia and the B·cska would have shared the fate of the Germans in Poland.  In Potsdam, during the summer of 1945 Stalin and Molotov insisted in spite of American protests that eight million Germans in Poland had fled.  In a similar fashion the world could have been informed successfully that the Hungarian Fascist rabble had fled to Hungary during the second half of October, 1944.  It was the task of the insurgent Slovak forces and of the Dukla army of general Svoboda to implement the expulsion of the Hungarians according to a carefully worked out political and military plan.  This plan was negated by the failure of the Horthy armistice negotiations.  Ludvik Svoboda, the later President of the Republic was a NKVD functionary according to Churaň a kol.: Kdo byl kdo v naöich dějin·ch ve 20. stoletÌ II., Libri, Prague 1998, p. 168.  K. Janics: The Kassa Government Program and the Collective Guilt of the Hungarians, PannÛnia, Pozsony, s.d. pp.  7-8.  According to the position taken by the Czechoslovak  Communist Party on August 23, 1944, ìWith the help of the Red Army, the Germans and Hungarians will be chased out of the occupied parts of Slovakia.î (This refers to the area given to Hungary by the first Vienna Award).  Three Slovak partisan groups, the JegorovÈ, BielikÈ and Sečansk›È, issued a printed leaflet entitled RoduvernÌ Slov·cÌ (Faithful  Slovaks). There we can read, ìWe organized, formed partisan units and went into the mountains and forests to wage merciless war against the Germans, Hungarians and traitors.  We follow the example of the Slovaks who in Soviet Ukraine, White Russia and the Crimea went over to Soviet partisans.  Together with them we will hit the Germans and Hungarians and will return as victors in the ranks of the Czechoslovak army.î  J. Jablonick›: Povstanie bez legiend. Obzor, Pozsony, 1990, pp. 104, 159.

 

[8]  IllyÈs, Gy.: The Pages of Beatrice. SzÈpirodalmi, Budapest, 1979, p. 87.

 

[9]  Ordinance M.E. 124, 1944  On the Identification Marks for Jews.  In: VÈrtes, M. ed.: Anti-Jewish Laws and Ordinances in Hungary, 1938-1945. Polg·r, Budapest, 1997, p. 330.

 

[10] ìVery soon Dr. Janota Mil·n, the Councilor of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Information and my principal debating partner, sat down next to me and said that he did not believe that Hungarians were not allowed to have a radio in Slovakia.  As a fortunate coincidence, I happen to have a copy of the ordinance in my briefcase.  I show it to him and tell him with perhaps less than diplomatic tact, ìSuch regulations are not uncommon in Europe. While you, Doctor, were in the United States Middle-European Jews had to listen to the radio in secret. Is not this a curious parallel?î I. Boldizs·r: Paris, 1946. L·tÛhat·r, May 1982, p. 34.  ìThe Constitution of the Slovak Fascist State discriminated against the Jews in exactly the same words as Decrees 33 and 108, which deprive Hungarians of their citizenship and expropriates their properties.  This perspective can even be enlarged.  The wording of the discriminatory ordinances of the Nazi State against the Jews is astonishingly similar to Decree 33.  Only those can be citizens who are members of the nation, non-citizens have no civil rights, etc.  According to Alfred Rosenberg, ëthe only law is the national interestí.î Janics, K.: The Years of Homelessness. Hunnia, Budapest, 1989 p. 184.  ìThe parallelism is justified also because it was after 1938 when the minority began to realize what it meant to be a Jew.î PeÈry, R. op.cit. p. 38.  ìFor the Slovak, the Hungarian is the Jew.î F·bry, Z. op.cit. p. 45.

 

[11]  ìThe world either fights for racial discrimination or against itÖ.I believe that we are facing the fate of the Armenians, perhaps administered with greater courtesy than Enver pasha.î Szalatnai, R.: In Two Countries with one Truth. Magvető, Budapest, 1982, pp. 328-329.  ìOn the front page of every issue of the Pozsony Pravda we see: ëSmrt faöizmuí (Death to Fascism).  Do you wish to commit suicide? Death to Fascism in this land can mean only the death of your chauvinism.  Yes, death to German and Hungarian Fascism so that Slav Fascism may flourishÖEurope is making a major mistake: It believes that Czechoslovakia is still number one and actually it is the Czech and the Slovak who drew a sharp dividing line between the first and the second republic.  This second one has nothing in common with democracy and humanity or with the first one that tried to implement democracy and humanism. For the world they hold up the first republic  -  as sucker bait.î F·bry, Z. op.cit. pp. 57, 74, 149.

 

[12]  Vadkerty, K.: Reslovakization. Kaligram, Pozsony, 1993, p. 62

 

[13]  PopÈly, Gy.: Population Decrease. Regio, Budapest, 1991, p.128.

 

[14]  Gyurgyik, L.: Hungarian Balance, Kalligram, Pozsony, 1994, p. 12.  Minutes of the December 4, 1945, 11th Session of the Czechoslovak government, ìAccording to J. Lichner Öit will be enough to expel 300,000 Hungarians, because the Hungarians are a type of people that is easy to assimilate and we can be sure that the remainder will be easily assimilated,ÖDr. Vl. Clementis, Assistant Secretary of State, shares the opinion that if there are not too many Hungarians left behind they will be easily assimilated.  During the discussion he also announced that he had told the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs that we were not interested in the fate of the Slovaks who did not wish to move to Slovakia and I assume that these Slovaks will be Hungarized and we wish you lots of luck.  According to Vice President J. Ursini Slovaks had to be settled along the border and the remaining Hungarians had to be resettled in the interior of the country.  J. Lichner added that this assimilation would mean for many Hungarians simply a return to their original nationality because these Hungarians were, in reality, Hungarized Slovaks.  (This is an ancient, unfounded myth that haunts even today).  The Government accepted the report.î  Koncsol, L.:A Look into the Political Witchesí Kitchen. Vas·rnap, November 26, 1995, p. 3. Gyula Henkey examined 30,247 adults between 1956 and 1991 of whom 28,187 were Hungarian, from an anthropological point of view.  This revealed who had assimilated whom.  ìThe Slavs here in the Carpathian Basin were not pure Slavs (Tretyakov, 1953) and in their evolution a significant role was played by the Central-Asian, mounted, cattle breeding people, particularly the late Avars. The mingling of the precursors of the Slovaks with the late Avars is mentioned by Eisner (1933) and F¸gedi (1938).  According to my studies in the Pal·cf–ld,    10.3 % showed the old Slavic type, 28.5 % were of a Turkic type and 10.6% were Finn-Ugrian. (Henkey, 1985). 

                My studies in the Zombor area and in Dunamocs may be significant from the point of view of Hungarian ancient history.  In Zobor a Turkic type could be demonstrated in 65.1% of the population compared to 47.7 % of the Hungarian average.

According to Anonymous, Prince Arpad donated the area around Kom·rom to the Kabar Chief, Ketel (Blaskovics, 1991)  This agrees with the finding that in the neighboring area of Dunamocs the incidence of the Turkic type is 52.9% and that within 10% of the Dinarian type there was a 6.4% incidence of the Caucasian variety, 2.5 times the Hungarian average.

                In 1991 I was able to do some studies in the Rimaszombat area near the Gortva rivulet. The combined incidence of the Turkic types was 65.8%, Finn-Ugrian 3.9% and old Slavic forms 0.4%....The part of the PalÛc center belonging to Slovakia preserved more of the Turkic-Hungarian characteristics than villages belonging to HungaryÖ. The Hungarians in the Gortva rivulet area show a remarkable affinity for the people in the Zombor area.î Henkey, Gy.: The Ethnic Anthropology of the Carpathian Basin People. The Society to Protect the Interests of Hungarian Youth, Leva, 1993, pp. 1, 8, 9,11 and 12.

 

[15]  Vadkerty, K. op.cit.

 

[16]   Raöla, A. LudovÈ s™dy v Československu po II. Svetove vojne ako forma mimoriadneho s™dnictva. SAV Pozsony, 1969, p. 153.

 

[17]  Janics, K.: Op.cit. pp. 207-208

 

[18]  Haraksim, L.:N·rodnosti na Slovensku VEDA, Pozsony 1993, pp. 97-98.  ìThe total number of deportees from Slovakia was 89,660.î Vadkerty, K.: The Deprtations. Kalligram, Pozsony, 1996, p. 10.

 

[19]  Ibid. p. 42

 

[20]  Zolczer, L.: There was a Slave Trade even in Peacetime.  Hungarians were Sold and Bought like Cattle! Szabad Žjs·g, January 14, 1998, p. 12.  Somogyi, M.: Servitude in Bohemia. Vas·rnap, August 24, 1990, p.3.

 

[21]  ìÖThe expulsion of the Hungarians from their native soil after the war was illegal and  unlawfulî  Dobal, V.: Dreadful Legal Standards. Žj SzÛ, October 6, 1998, p.2.

 

[22]   On August 15, 1997 the Slovakian Head of State told the Slovak Radio that he had told Horn, ìTo have the two countries  make it possible that a population exchange take place.  This would mean that the Slovaks in Hungary could move to Slovakia and the Hungarians in Slovakia to Hungary.  According to Mečlar, the Hungarians refused to discuss this.î  NeszmÈri, S.: Mečlar Really put it to Horn. Szabad Ujs·g, August 27, 1997, p.2.  ìAs a third item I suggested that we introduce the principle of free mobility of individuals for the Slovak and Hungarian citizens living respectively in Hungary or Slovakia.  Thus if the Slovaks living in Hungary would prefer to live in Slovakia, the Hungarian government would release them freely and the Slovak government would agree to receive them into the country.  Neither country should put any pressure on these citizens or make them leave other than by their own free willÖWhen I said this, Prime Minister Horn, on the other side of the table turned whiteÖî  What did Mečlar Say?, Vas·rnap, October 1, 1997,p. 4.  Here are some reactions, George Funar, Mayor of Kolozsvar, ìI will recommend the establishment of a similar arrangement between Romania and Hungary.î The Population Exchange is Unlawful. Vas·rnap, October 14, 1997, p.4.  Juraj Alner, the editor of N·rodn· Obrode, ìThe expulsion or transfer of populations that is not individual but collective is a sad episode of history.  Today is the 50th anniversary of the transfer of the Hungarian population from Slovakia.  It is clear that this cannot be the solution for any problem.  On the contrary, this creates such problems that become unmanageable and might have catastrophic results.  Even the idea is highly dangerous.î  GÈza Gal·n, actor, ìI agree with the eminent German newspaper that called every Slovakian problem by its proper name.  They state that the tragic problems  can be called by the name of the president of Horrorland.î  Can there be a solution? Vas·rnap, September 245, 197.  If we want to be consistent, we must reject any plan that wishes to repatriate the masses of Cs·ngÛs.

 

[23] Based on a lecture of Katalin Vadkerty

 

[24]  For details see: Jederman, F.: ZtracenÈ dejiny. ISE Prague, 1990;  Jak ûivot opustil öumavskÈ Pohoři? LidovÈ noviny . June 1, 1994, p.9  ìÖBohemia was the home of two nations.  The Czech nationalists deprived the Germans in Czechosovakia of their citizenship rights and designated them as immigrantsÖIn two generations they established dozens of cities that became the basis of the ruling nationalityís economyÖ.If somebody mentions today, at the end of the XXth C. that the Germans participated in the building of the Czech State, this could not be deniedÖThis has been our joint country for centuriesÖThe world that was favorable for the undisturbed coexistence of the two nationalities in Czechoslovakia is gone forever.  The stones witnessing the coexistence are falling down.  I roam over this land and see the ruins of Ronov, Hasiötejn and R›znburk, the carcass of the church of Oseck and Broumov, the falling plaster of Červen›  Hr·dok ős Jezeřa.  I appear like the lover of the medieval Christianity, who traveling in Asia Minor, said, ìThis is were Galatea lived, here is Ephesus, Pergamon, there is LaodiceaÖî Přihoda, P: Lost History. Details from the authorís book entitled Czech Period, Vas·rnap, June 27, 1993, p.0.

řř

[25]  Vadkerty, K. op.cit.

 

[26]  Koöick› Večer, October 11, 1991, p. 5 and September 4, 1997, p.1

 

[27] Henkey, Gy. Op.cit.

 

[28]  According to the UN Resolution of December 13, 1946 genocide is the denial of the right of population groups to exist.  Punishing such actions is an international requirement. (Středni Evropa 1990/14, p.42). Accordingly spiritual genocide was also a punishable offense.

 

[29]  Vadkerty, K. op cit.

 

[30]  After the World War 2,921,000 Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia and this number included the Germans from Carpathian Slovakia.  From the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania a total of 11,730,000 Germans were expelled (Magyarorsz·g, 1990/36 p. 5)  In Czechoslovakia it is estimated that approximately 220-270,000 Germans died due to the deportations and the brutalities (Sudeten German estimate).  A survey in the DDR in the 50s indicated that there were 18,000 death associated with the deportations which included the suicides.  Five thousand five hundred deaths were directly attributable to violence according to Dr. Jan Kučera a member of the Central and Eastern-European Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences.  Naturally not every death was witnessed and thus the real number is even larger. ìOn the other hand, I would not be pleased if my numbers, which are lower than those cited by the Sudeten German circles, were to bring satisfaction, saying that it was not so bad after all.î N·rodn· Obroda, September 9, 1991, p. 134. (This is a report on the interview published in issue 129 of ZemedelskÈ noviny).

 

[31]   îThe history of the Czechs indicates that ëethnic cleansingí does not achieve the goal the cleansers envisaged, namely ethnic unity and the undisturbed development of the nationÖ.

                One of the reasons for this is that although a population group can be displaced the community does not entirely disappear. It can undergo dreadful suffering and humiliation but it then again coalesces and tries to find an answer as to why it became the target of persecutionÖ.If a group once gains self -consciousness it will not give this up even if it has to suffer overt attacks.  This indeed is the most striking characteristic of collective self-consciousnessÖ

                The second reason is that the expellers find it difficult to fill the empty spaces created, not only territorially and demographically, but culturally, morally and intellectually as well.  The newly acquired areas somehow stay outside the common horizon as though they had never been fully acquired.

                It takes at least three generations before the new settlers really feel at home in their new estatesÖ.

                The third cause is the matter of guiltÖThere is general fear of losing the acquired territory and of vengeance and there is also nervousness, doubt and pity and the conviction that if the victims would ever gain sufficient strength to reverse the events they would do so.

                It is very difficult to get rid of this feeling.î  Sch–pflin, GY.: op.cit. pp. 40-41.   Maria Schmidt writes, ìM·rai writes that in this century more than 100 million people were the victims of collective punishment..î Lovas, I.:The Century of Collective Punishment. Žj Demokrata, December 1, 1994, p. 18.

 

[32]   Hejl, V.: Zpr·va o organizovanÈm n·silÌ. Univerzum, Prague, 1990, p. 17.

 

[33]  Středni Evropa, 1990/15, ìIn my more than ten years of investigation into these events, I have never met an eyewitness who agreed with the described atrocities.î Havel, J.: V z·jmu pravdyÖ.LidovÈ noviny, July 13, 1990, P.4.

 

[34]   Hejl, V.: op.cit, p. 15. Středni Evropa, 1990/15.  ìThe majority of the Sudeten Germans had no idea of the post-war plans of Mr. Beneö and his emigrant associates.  In many places it was expected that after the Czechs took over the police and administrative powers, the situation would return to normal after the horroros and violence of war.  It was a horrible awakening for the Sudeten Germans when the first trucks arrived from central Czechoslovakia to the Sudeten area.  The trucks were filled with revolutionary guards dressed mostly in German uniforms and armed with German weapons.  While the local Czechs or those who settled earlier in the Sudeten region returned, they generally assumed a reasonable attitude.  ÖThe units sent by the central Czech authorities brought with them all the horrors of murder, rape, torture, humiliation and exploitation.  In many areas large scale executions and blood baths were organized, the most dreadful ones ever recorded in European history.  In Prague these mass crimes were related to street fighting after May 5.  Even here, however, there was a difference right from the beginning between the bourgeois-conservative groups and the extreme nationalists who acted hand in hand with the Communists to achieve their goals.  Incited by the Prague radio that had fallen into Czech hands, the entire city fell into a state of bloodthirsty mass hysteria that opened wide the gates of sadism and led to such horrendous acts that far surpassed the horrors of the Husite persecutionsÖ.Similar events took place in other Czech, Moravian and Silesian cities.  The mass bestialities at times took such form that the occupying Soviet forces put a stop to them..î Turnwald, W.: Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen II. Středni Evropa 1990/14, p. 35.  Just as in North Transylvania toward the end of the War, every reasonable person must agree that the Czech vengeance was many times worse than the crimes committed by the Germans against the Czechs.  If the person responsible for the idea and implementation of the mass expulsion is not a war criminal than neither is K.H. Frank or Rosenberg.  If the mass expulsion was not a crime than the concept of crime has no meaning. And if any one person among the Czechs doesnít admit that our nation is guilty toward the German nation, just as the Germans have admitted their own guilt, then that person is guilty of the acts for which there is no worse example in History.  Other than the extermination of the Jews, the Soviet deportation and the Soviet extermination of their own people, the Eastern-European mass population transfers were the most barbaric actions in contemporary Europe.  Masarykís pupil, Beneö stood at its cradle and Masarykís son kept quiet.î Andreas: Ceske bloudeni III.  In: Kučera, K.:Kapitoly z dejin Středni.  Ĉeöi a Němci Evropy. Munich, 1989, p. 237.  Beneö in his 1946 Christmas message said, ìIn our country Christmas this year has a special significance.  It is the first time that we can celebrate it without Germans.î

                ìThis is in such execrable taste that there are but few examples for it.  They celebrate without the displaced persons and the people without homes, fugitives.  And they gloat about it! Es ist erreicht!î F·bry, Z. op.cit. p. 142.  Pochod Smrti přeûila zazrakem. Lidove noviny, December 19, 1995, p.5.  The Calvary of the Germans in the Slovakian Carpathian regions deserves a seoarate chapter. Kiss, J.î Povedat pravdu o krivd·ch. Vikend, March 2, 1991, p.2.  Chovanec, J.: Trest bez s™du. Slobodn› Piatok, February 15, 1991, p.9.  Vicsotka, M.: The Dead were still Alive (270 were butchered in Dobsina) Kapu 1990/10 pp. 20-21/  Osudy  Nemcov na Slovensku.  ìBefore the War 150,000 ñ now 15,000?î V›ber, 1991/36 pp. 17-19.

 

[35]  The Presidential Decrees of Eduard Beneö or the Deprivation of the Rights of the Hungarians and of the Germans. Pannonia, Pozsony, 1996, pp.300-302.;  The Beneö Decrees and their implementation fully satisfy the criteria of crimes against humanity.  They have not been withdrawn by the leaders of Czechoslovakia or by the leaders of her Successor States.  There was no apology or even a bowing of the head before the Hungarian nation or the Hungarians in the FelvidÈk.î  Izs·k, L.: There was no Apology. Magyar Nemzet, March 7, 1997, p.10.

 

[36]  It is an ancient legal axiom that if law is in opposition to ethics the law must be changed.

 

[37]  Hejl, V. op.cit. p.13.

 

[38]  In an opinion poll conducted in Czechoslovakia in July 1994, 57% felt that the validity of the Decrees had to be preserved, 9% felt that some of them should be revised, 7% felt that all of them should be revised and 27% had no opinion.. Sme February 18, 1995, p.1.  Milan Uhde, the President of the Czech Parliament agreed that from todayís point of view the Beneö Decrees were not pleasant reading. But called them patches sewn on a coarse fabric.  Vaclav Klaus, the Head of Government, refused to condemn the decrees on a moral basis. Uhde would consider this as removing the patch and judging it on its own merits (LidovÈ noviny, May 31, 1995, p.1.)  The negative attitude of the Czechs can be documented in innumerable instances, particularly in relation to the case when Rudolf Dreithaler appealed to the Czech Constitutional Court in Brno.  Dreithaler, a German national, was given back his house in Liberec because after the war his family was not expelled and it could not be shown that during the war he had ever behaved in a hostile manner.  Yet, they acted only on the basis of the decrees of that time and furthermore, his mother was Czech and the house was part of her estate. (LidovÈ noviny, November 22, 1994, p.16 and June 9, 1996, p.17, June 23, 1995, p.1, June 27, 1995, p.6.)  In addition there are six Sudeten Germans who demand the return of their property.  Dreithaler asked that the 1945/108 decree used to expropriate German and Hungarian property be declared invalid.  He used the same arguments as did we in this essay. The Head of State had no right to issue such decrees that was the exclusive right of the Parliament also that Benes was not even the legal Head of State. (HÛrak, I.: Před Žstavnim soudem bude okolo Beneöova dekrÈtu asi horko. Lidove noviny, March 6, 1996, p.16.)  Bohumil Doleûal, Czech political scientist correctly points out that the Constitutional Court interpreted the law in a very peculiar fashion.  The Court stated, ìÖthe expropriation was not done because of enmity toward the Czechoslovak Republic or against the Czech or Slovak people, regardless of nationalityÖî

                We must quote Section 2 of Par.1 of Decree 108.  According to this ìthe property of all German and Hungarian individuals will be expropriated without compensation except of those persons who can prove that they remained loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, never committed any offense against the Czech and Slovak nation or participated actively in the fight for liberation or suffered from the Fascist and Nazi terror.î  The above statement that expropriation was not based on nationality is more than brazen.  FurthermoreÖîit is the truth that every Hungarian and German was considered to be an enemy unless he could prove that he was active and suffered as a consequence.  Such inaccuracy in a legal document is astonishing,î The author than makes a comparison to document the ludicrous nature of the Constitutional Courtís decisionÖ ìLet us imagine that we ordered that every Communist or Communist sympathizer would have his estate expropriated and they would be deprived of their civil rights.î  They would include the members of the Party, members of pro-communist organizations and all of those who during this period voted for the National Front.  ìI quote this only in order for us to be careful and not believe that something happening to us was different from the same thing happening to somebody else.î Doleûal, B.:Everybody is equal but some are more equal than others. LidovÈ noviny, March 1`7, 1995, p.8.

 

[39]  Escutcheon of the Slovak National Council, ìH–chster Nationalismus is h–chster Sozialismusî Highest Nationalism is Highest Socialism (Hitler, 1933).  Fabry Z., op.cit. p.83.

 

[40]   According to K·roly Udvardy precisely 89 such anti-German and Hungarian ordinances were enacted (Kassa, April 5, 1945, Magyarok Vasarnapja, November 27, 1994, p.4)  In Prague in 1995 the issue date of all 142 Decrees were published in book form and the most important 44 were published in their entirety.   The volume contains several other contemporary documents.  On this occasion President V·clav Havel made a statement that is a hair-raising statement coming from a humanist.  ìI must admit that in the so-called Beneö Decrees there are many things about which I am critical but I donít know whether a 59 year-old man at the end of the XXth C. has the right to pass judgment on decision made more than 50 years earlier in an entirely different era.î  The journalist, representing the paper asked him which of the decrees he would refuse to sign.  V·clav Havel admitted that he asked himself this question on numerous occasions but believes that it is meaningless because he had not been a part of the system of the times in which thus decision would have had to be made.  The President sees the primary significance of the Decrees in the fact that they laid the groundwork for the renewal of the Czechoslovak statehood at a time when there was no freedom and made the post-war role of Czechoslovakia as one of the victorious states possible.  Dekrety na Prazskem hrade. LidovÈ noviny, September 27, 1995, p.16.  ìV·clav Havel, who WAS a great hero, in his ënobleí letters written to the most prestigious and Nobelist writers, in the most distinguished publications, instructs us about the task of the intelligentsia, about separation from politics and internal freedom.  He is a new Marcus Aurelius.  The fact is that in the mean time his own party and several others had been taken over, that freedom of the press is gone and that the Slovak gypsies have been deprived of their citizenship, that the Czech Constitutional Court confirms the collective guilt of the Germans and Hungarians, the Gottwald-Novotny-Husak routine is continued in an ultra-conservative garb and without retribution, albeit there is nothing to avenge.î  Tam·s, G.M.: Dr. Klaus csehoja, Nepszava, June 6, 1995, p.6.

 

[41]   SvětovÈ dějiny v kostce. Touûmsk› a Moravec. Prague 1946, p.456.

 

[42]  Esti Ujs·g, December 20, 1935.

 

[43]   The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic.  Government Publications Office Prague, 1923. T he further quotations from the Constitution are all from this work although the translations may be in poor Hungarian.

 

[44]  Tom·öek, D.: Denik druhÈ republiky. Naöe Vojsko. Prague, 1988, p. 96.  ìAfter the representatives and senators of the occupied areas had withdrawn the reduced Parliament elected a new President of the Republic on November 30, 1938 in the person of Emil H·cha, the President of the Highest Administrative Court.  It is true that the 14 day time period specified by Par. 59 of the Constitution was ignored.  Eduard Beneö acknowledged the fact of the presidential election and even congratulated his successor from London.  Seeing later how the war progressed he started acting during his exile in London as though he had resigned in October 1938 under Nazi pressure and hence his resignation was not valid.  In fact, his resignation was in accordance with Par. 59 of the Constitution.  Regardless how the war and the political situation changed over time, Eduard Beneö was no longer the President of the Czechoslovak Republic.  His resignation could not be construed as though it never happened.î Gy–ny–r, J.: From the Kassa Government Program to the unlawful Beneö Decrees, or the Satanic Scrip of De-Hungarization. In: The Presidential Decrees of Eduard BeneööÖop.cit. p.82.

 

[45]  Later Communist historian represented H·cha as a Czech Quisling (Pasak, T.:Prezident Emil H·cha nebyl Quisling. LidovÈ noviny, June 27, 1995, p.3.) Hachaís life can be divided into five sections. In the first section he was a councilor of the Vienna Administrative Court (1916). He became the vice-chair of the Highest Czechoslovak Administrative Court (1919) and its president (1925). He had the reputation of a distinguished expert.  He was a thorough student and admirer of the British legal system.  His second period  opened when he was elected President of Czechoslovakia, November 30, 1938 ñ March 15, 1939.  An ominous prelude to his third period was the Berlin visit on March 14-15, 1939.  The same thing happened as during the Klessheim visit of MiklÛs Horthy.  H·cha was forced to yield to Hitlerís threats and he returned to Prague as the President of the occupied Czech-Moravian Protectorate.  The German occupation meant the mayfly-like existence of the second Czechoslovak Republic.  On March 14, under pressure from Hitler, Slovakia declared its independence.  H·chaís fourth period was the most heroic one.  He and his associates tried to oppose the brutal German oppression.  He successfully used his personal influence and managed to rescue many Czechs from German prisons.  He kept in contact with the underground forces and with the leader of the ÈmigrÈ government in London and followed his instructions even though Beneö denied this after the war.  His government was headed by Alois Eli·ö, the same man to whom Prime Minister P·l Teleki had suggested a secret anti-German alliance.  (For more on this, see: Masarik, H.:The Last Days with General Eli·ö. Unio. 1991/92, pp.15-29).  H·cha refused to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler and in spite of repeated urgings, refused to have his government issue the anti-Jewish ordinances.  He had some room to move because at that time it was still important for Hitler to maintain a semblance of legality. When at the end of 1941, the moderate and decent Konstantin von Neurath was replaced by Reinhard Heydrich as Reich Protector, H·chaís most tragic period began.  He wished to resign but on Beneöí request did not do so. On Nazi pressure he was forced to appoint a collaborator government and all his former associates were removed.  He lost contact with the underground and Beneö abandoned him to his fate.  The last period began in 1943.  By this time H·chaís cerebral sclerosis had progressed to the point that he slowly lost touch with reality.  He was no longer a functional human being and became a puppet whose name could be used without him being able to do anything about it. He no longer realized what went on and what he was doing.  Tom·öek, D. and Kvaček, R.: Causa Emil H·cha, Themis, Prague, 1995.

 

[46] Pek·rek, S.: Odkaz Beneöova socialismu.  StudentskÈ Listy, 1991/4, p.4.  Doing this Beneö not only committed a lawless act but so did the members of his government and of the National Assembly because they violated Act 50/1923 on the Security of the State.  According to Par. 14 of this act anybody who agitates and incites to violence against any subset of the population because of the nationality, language, race or religion or because they have no religion is punishable by 1-12 months of hard labor.  Anybody who foments hatred against any subset of the population for any of the above reasons may be punishable with hard labor from 14 days to one year.  Who does the same against individuals may be sentenced to hard labor for 8 days to three months.  Whoever vilifies the Republic, the nation or one of the national minorities in a harsh and agitating manner and this action, performed in public might be detrimental to the countryís position, peace or international respect, is punishable in the same way as above. (Par.39) H·cha, Hoetzl, Weyr, Laötovka , eds. : Slovnik veřejnÈho pr·va československÈho II. s.d. p.1136.

 

[47]Hejl, V. op.cit. pp. 17-18.  ì Beneö promulgates Decree 115 on May 8, 1946ÖThis made Bohemia and Slovakia the only countries in the world (with the exception of the empire of Gengis Khan) where there are laws in effect that grant amnesty to mass murderers of the civilian population..î Vasky, R.:Vdíaku nečak·me, len oûivenie pam”ti Zmena. 1994/243, p.12.

 

[48]  ÖThe law of denationalization was placed into the law primarily for the protection of the majority.  The regulation is in very general terms. Violence is not defined legally or scientifically.  Who will decide whether economic pressure or offering benefits or other advantages for assimilation can be defined as dishonest manipulations within the term of denationalization?  The major deficiency is in the fact that according to the constitution the ban against denationalization would have to be made legal by a separately enacted facultative act and the lex imperfecta would have to be converted into a lex perfecta with appropriate penalties.  There is a 1921 act, No. 309 ìAgainst oppression and for the protection of free assemblyî.  Some sections of this act could make the ban on denationalization legal.  In practice, however, this act was used only in general cases and in cases of religious or social oppression and was applied primarily against the national minorities.  Lastly in the battle for assimilation some protection is granted by the Act on the Protection of the Republic (50/1923). Par. 14 punishes agitation or incitement against linguistic or religious groups.  This paragraph was used repeatedly for the protection of members of the national minorities but its language is so loose that it is usually ineffective against forceful assimilation.  Proving the infraction, incitement agitation, hatemongering is so difficult that it is almost impossible to stop groups working under the protective mantle of some other act.  It is totally ineffective in stopping the assimilation efforts of lower level functionaries, organizations, offices or public institutionsÖ.

                The assimilative efforts are led by the most powerful and most heavily endowed forces.î  Duka ZÛlyomi,N.: Assimilation. In: Borsody, I. ed.: The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938. Az Orsz·g Žtja, Budapest, 1938, pp.48-49.

 

[49]  Habsburg, O. von: The Shameful Beneö Decrees , entry into the European Union? Magyars·g, October 28, 1995, p.3.

 

[50]  ìWhat an uproar there was when Hitler deprived the emigrant writers, scientists and politicians of their citizenship.  There were a total of 300.  Yet here, a stroke of the pen destroyed the citizenship of entire populations and places them outside of the protection of the law.  And the world is silent.î F·bry, Z. op.cit. p.143.

 

[51]  H·cha, et al. op.cit. I. pp.987-990.;

 

[52]  Josef Kalvoda is quoted by Hejl, I. op.cit. p.22.

 

[53]  Hejl, V.: Rozvrat. Univerzum, Prague, 1990, p.129.

 

[54]  The position of the Czech government is incomprehensible because, ìAccording to Klaus, the cabinet after the war considered the Beneö Decrees as an integral part of the Czech legal system even though most of them had long since accomplished their purpose and have no practical significance at this time.î LidovÈ noviny, July 3, 1995, p.3.

 

[55]  Petr·ček, Z.: NesplnitelnÈ pr·vo. N·pravu křivdy na sudetsk›ch Němcich by naöe společnost neunesla. Respekt, December 16-22, 1991, p.8.

 

[56]  ìThe whole matter is more a moral than an economic matter.  I donít believe that we need it to live a decent life in Germany but I also donít  think that we wish to live in the Czech Republic as suspect minoritiesÖ.If we want truth to prevail without having before our eyes the higher function of peace, it will lead to overt or covert vengeance.  If we want to make peace without being fair with each other it is hypocrisy.î RudÈ Pr·vo, August 31, 1943. Published by Magyarorsz·g, October 7, 1994, p.15.

 

 

[57]  ìIt is undeniable that what happened to the Sudeten Germans at the end of World War II in Czechoslovakia was genocide.

                The greatest problem is the so-called Beneö Decrees, those illegal ordinances issued by Beneö as President of the Republic.  The same holds for the Amnesty Act (115/1946) that declared that all atrocities committed against the Germans were legal as were the expropriation of German properties.  The fact of the Germansí expulsion from Czechoslovakia is made even worse by the fact that the expelled people were not allowed to purchase their own property backÖ.There is no question that this is a racial issue and hence a violation of human rightsÖBecause human rights are inalienable parts of ëAequis Communautaireí i.e. the heritage of the community, it is impossible to accept a country into the European Community which does not respect these fundamental principles.  If the European Union were to accept it, it would lose all credibility.

                In Prague they say that the Beneö Decrees cannot be the subject of discussion.  The main argument is that the passing of time has made the Decrees an inseparable part of Czechoslovak history.  Such an argument is legally untenable.  In my opinion every country must be prepared to remedy any unjust act it may have committed in the past.

                Whoever expresses such an opinion is considered to be an enemy of the Czech Republic.î Otto von Habsburg, op.cit. pp.131-132.    Karel Srp, one of the most important former Czech dissidents comments on the Hapsburg statement as follows, ìThe representative in the European Parliament, wearing the colors of the Bavarian CSU, an important person, said that the Czechs had to wipe out the Beneö Decrees, have to sell the land back to the Germans, must change the way of dealing with them and must stop discrimination.  If not, according to the representative, we will not be accepted into the European Union.  It appears that in that organization they do not vote or have already reached a decision.  Furthermore, the son of the last Austrian Emperor claims that our present legal system is based on violation of human rights and that we are a sorry Republic.î

                ìIn the quoted conversation Habsburg speaks with the voice of Hitler.î  N·rodn· Obroda, November 4, 1995, p.7.

 

[58]   LidovÈ noviny, February 25, 1994, p.3.

 

[59]  Republika, July 2, 1993,m pp.1-2.

 

[60]  RudÈ Pravo, July 22, 1992, p.1.

 

[61]  Schuster, R.: N·vrat do velíkej politiky. PressPrint. Kassa 1999, p.120.

 

[62]  ìFor those who live in a closed system of personal injury, never consider the injuries of others objectively quantitatively or qualitatively, and are considered only from the point of view of whether they justify and strengthen their own injuries or disturb and mitigate them.î BibÛ, I.: op.cit. II. p.700.

 

[63]   Ibid. p.657.  On the Slovak side this issue was faced only by Vladimir Min·č, a writer and Martin M. äimečka, a writer and journalist.  The latter writes, ìThe book of the Pozsony Kalligram Publisher is for me the first intentional attempt to establish a relationship.  The documents or perhaps rather the confessions written by Zolt·n F·bry, Rezső PeÈry and Rezső Szalatnai address the tragic situation of the Hungarian minority after World War II.  This book is very sad because it deals with disappointment, the lost hope for justice, the loneliness of the Hungarians and despair.  The much hoped for peace only brought additional suffering. The disappointment was even greater because ìnobody speaks up against the implementation and persecution, nobody, nobody, nobody.  There hasnít been one word, or doubt from the lips of a single Czech or Slovak intellectualî. (F·bry, Z.: The Accused Speaks, p.60.)  Why should the Hungarian minority trust us.  Where do the Slovak politicians get the impertinence from to even expect such a thing.

                ìThis book was published in Slovakian and while I was reading it I had the feeling that I was standing in front of an X-ray machine and examined my body with a borrowed magnifying glass.  I saw things of whose existence I was totally ignorant.  I donít know how many Slovaks will be willing to read this book. The readers are in danger, whether they like the book or not, that they will never be able again to hide behind well-meaning ignorance. ì  äimečka, M.M.: Obûalovani prehovorili. Smr, February 20, 1995. p.14.  In Hungarian: The Accused Speaks, Vas·rnap, March 20, p.5. (Kalligram, Pozsony, 1994). K·lm·n Janicsí book ìThe Years of Homelessness, was published in Slovakian by Puski Publisher..  Thus the Slovaks and Czechs can really not claim today that ìwe didnít know what happenedî.  The position taken by Vladimir Minač deserves recognition because he wishes to make amends to the Hungarians even though it is ingrained in the Slovaks that during the 150 years before 1945 the Hungarian Kingdom wished to create an ethnically homogenous country by denationalizing the Slovaks and other minorities and by ethnic cleansing. ìWe have our own set of sins.  I remember a number of anti-Hungarian waves of hate I particularly remember the ones after the war when independently of national or religious affiliation we focused on our own little Slovak vengeance.  When we were willing to even agree with Beneö if he would move out an appropriate number of Hungarians and resettle them in the recently evacuated Sudeten area.  We persecuted the Hungarians as such, not as collaborators but as aliens and undesirables.  We hated not only the Hungarians but their language as well.

                We must humbly apologize for all Slovak transgressions, for the suffering of all Hungarians.  We are not dealing with wolves but with fellow citizens.  This was crude, unworthy and un-Slovak.î  Minač, VíN·vraty k prevratu, NVK International, Pozsony, 1993, pp.115-116.  That not everybody thinks the same way is shown by the fact that they are selling a 2001 calendar in Slovakia that shows the events of 1945 in 13 pictures and which mention the Beneö Decrees with barely concealed approval (1945, Spoločností, Společnost. Millenium 2001).  For more on this, see: Balassa, Z.:A Calendar. Žj Idők, 2001/3 pp.1-2.